Aggregate Autonomy, the Difference Principle, and the Calabresian Approach to Products Liability

To illuminate and develop further the principle of aggregate autonomy, this chapter compares that principle’s defense of Calabresian theory with one that might be offered by Rawlsian analysis including the difference principle. It reviews the salient points of the Calabresian approach to products liability. The chapter then explores potential Rawlsian justifications for the Calabresian approach both under A Theory of Justice and John Rawls’s recent work, Political Liberalism. The chapter describes the principle of aggregate autonomy and reviews its defense of Calabresian theory. It also...

To illuminate and develop further the principle of aggregate autonomy, this chapter compares that principle’s defense of Calabresian theory with one that might be offered by Rawlsian analysis including the difference principle. It reviews the salient points of the Calabresian approach to products liability. The chapter then explores potential Rawlsian justifications for the Calabresian approach both under A Theory of Justice and John Rawls’s recent work, Political Liberalism. The chapter describes the principle of aggregate autonomy and reviews its defense of Calabresian theory. It also compares these two defenses in order to contrast the difference principle and the principle of aggregate autonomy. The chapter tries to locate aggregate autonomy within the landscapes of tort law and moral philosophy. It finally reflects on the advantages of theories of the good, such as aggregate autonomy, over theories of the right, such as the difference principle.