Oxford Index Search Results

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difference principle x Moral Philosophy x clear all

difference principle

Overview page. Subjects: Philosophy.

The principle chosen by rational people from behind the veil of ignorance, in Rawls's A Theory of Justice. The principle requires that social benefits and burdens are allocated in such a...

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 The Second Principle of Justice

Thomas Pogge.

in John Rawls

January 2007; p ublished online May 2007 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 11321 words.

This chapter discusses the second principle of justice, which is made up of the opportunity principle and the difference principle. The difference principle and how it is meant to operate...

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Decisions Behind the Veil

Justin P. Bruner.

in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2

March 2018; p ublished online May 2018 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 4756 words.

This chapter explores the behavior of individuals placed in circumstances approximating the ‘veil of ignorance.’ Unlike previous experiments of Rawls’ veil, it considers Rawls’ fair...

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Animal Rights and Human Limitations

Mary Anne Warren.

in Moral Status

March 2000; p ublished online October 2011 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 6660 words.

This chapter discusses the moral status of nonhuman animals. It argues that theories of moral status based solely upon intrinsic properties imply that we must condemn as irrational all such...

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The Case Against the Right to Exclude

Phillip Cole.

in Debating the Ethics of Immigration

October 2011; p ublished online May 2015 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 17655 words.

This chapter presents a general moral case against the right to exclude within the context of immigration controls. One source of doubt about the ethics of immigration controls arises from...

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The Argument from Distribution

Shelly Kagan.

in How to Count Animals, more or less

March 2019; p ublished online April 2019 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 9881 words.

Most people embrace one or another distributive principle (such as a principle of equality, or desert, or views like prioritarianism, or sufficientarianism). But if the unitarian is correct...

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Philosophy

Roger Teichmann.

in Nature, Reason, and the Good Life

June 2011; p ublished online January 2012 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 8160 words.

What has philosophy got to do with life? Some of the virtues of thought required for thinking about life are substantially the same as ones required for thinking philosophically. ‘Look to...

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Military Use of Lethal Force

Seumas Miller.

in Shooting to Kill

December 2016; p ublished online November 2016 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 11489 words.

In this chapter, just war theory is outlined, including jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and a version provided that accommodates wars fought by and against nonstate actors (e.g., terrorist...

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The Truth in Particularism

Joseph Raz.

in Engaging Reason

January 2002; p ublished online November 2003 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 14814 words.

Particularism's model of explanation is challenged on the ground that a sensible intelligibility principle requires that there must be an explanation for the difference between a good and a...

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Feminism and the ‘Crisis of Rationality’

Sabina Lovibond.

in Essays on Ethics and Feminism

September 2015; p ublished online September 2015 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 8114 words.

This essay engages in the close reading of some texts that pride themselves on their feminist political credentials. It focuses mainly on Rosi Braidotti’s deployment of a contrast between...

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Testing Kantian Maxims

Steven Sverdlik.

in Motive and Rightness

February 2011; p ublished online May 2011 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 12494 words.

One version of Kant's Categorical Imperative—the Formula of Universal Law—speaks of testing an agent's ‘maxim’ for moral permissibility. A maxim is a truncated piece of practical reasoning...

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Intentional Action

Roger Teichmann.

in The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe

April 2008; p ublished online September 2008 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 18425 words.

The account, in Intention, of intentional action and of expressions of intention makes use of three important notions: non-observational knowledge, the question ‘Why?’ in its...

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Killing in War

Jeff McMahan.

April 2009; p ublished online September 2009 .

Book. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 272 pages.

Killing a person is in general among the most seriously wrongful forms of action, yet most of us accept that it can be permissible to kill people on a large scale in war. Does morality...

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EXTENSIONAL EQUIVALENCE

David Lyons.

in Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism

November 1965; p ublished online October 2011 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 22240 words.

Why should one suppose that it makes an important difference how the principle of utility is applied? Why should philosophers be inclined to assume that acts are assessed differently when...

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Hierarchy and the Value of Outcomes

Shelly Kagan.

in How to Count Animals, more or less

March 2019; p ublished online April 2019 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 16239 words.

Acceptable versions of distributive principles will take status into account, so that an animal at a given level of well-being will, by virtue of its lower status, have a correspondingly...

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Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong

Sarah McGrath.

in Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory in Ethics

March 2015; p ublished online April 2015 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 10873 words.

This chapter explores a neglected puzzle due to Gilbert Ryle. According to Ryle, while non-moral knowledge can at least in principle always be lost in virtue of being forgotten, it would be...

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Getting from Here to There

Eva Feder Kittay.

in Medicine and Social Justice

September 2012; p ublished online May 2015 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 9355 words.

This chapter examines the importance of providing health care resources and other protections for cognitively disabled people, arguing that doing so is central to adequate principles of...

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Humanitarian Armed Intervention

Seumas Miller.

in Shooting to Kill

December 2016; p ublished online November 2016 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 10017 words.

In this chapter it is argued that humanitarian armed intervention in relation to large-scale human rights violations is in some cases morally justified (e.g., the Rwanda genocide), and that...

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Commentary

Soraj Hongladarom.

in The Future of Bioethics

January 2014; p ublished online January 2014 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 1408 words.

The author discusses Maschke’s preference of a pull approach in genetic testing and evaluates how this approach accommodates the principle of individual autonomy and privacy. Furthermore,...

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‘Ought’ and ‘Right’

R. M. Hare.

in The Language of Morals

March 1963; p ublished online November 2003 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 4392 words.

Hare argues that, though some philosophers have drawn a rigid distinction between ‘good’ and ‘right’ or ‘ought’, these words are logically related. Thus, ‘right’ or ‘ought’ is equally...

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Profound Offense

Joel Feinberg.

in The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Volume 2: Offense to Others

May 1988; p ublished online February 2006 .

Chapter. Subjects: Moral Philosophy. 21893 words.

Profound offenses are misleadingly characterized as simply “offensive nuisances” because of their perceived qualitative difference from mere nuisances, and because of their independence of...

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