Chapter

Accidents

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

in Leibniz’s Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles

Published in print August 2014 | ISBN: 9780198712664
Published online September 2014 | e-ISBN: 9780191781018 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712664.003.0014
Accidents

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This chapter is a discussion of the thesis, maintained most prominently by Kenneth Clatterbaugh, but not only by him, that Leibniz admitted perfectly similar accidents and that he took the similarity of substances to derive from the similarity of their accidents. The chapter argues against this double thesis. The chapter also questions the assumption that Leibniz believed in accidents as a distinct kind of entity. The conclusion is that if Leibniz reified accidents, he took the Identity of Indiscernibles to hold true of them. And it is also argued that, even if Leibniz reified accidents, he should have maintained that the similarity of substances does not derive from the similarity of their accidents.

Keywords: accidents; Nominalism; substance

Chapter.  7367 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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