Daniel Z. Korman

in Objects

Published in print November 2015 | ISBN: 9780198732532
Published online January 2016 | e-ISBN: 9780191796760 | DOI:

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The argument from material constitution purports to show that one who accepts that there are such ordinary objects as statues will be committed to saying that objects can be distinct despite being coincident. This chapter considers a variety of strategies for avoiding the implication that objects like statues are distinct from the objects that constitute them (e.g., lumps of clay), and finds them wanting. It then shows how proponents of distinct coincident objects can explain the modal differences between the coinciding objects. Along the way, it argues against invoking an ‘is’-of-constitution to explain away the unpalatable consequences of this sort of view.

Keywords: constitution; coincidence; dominant kinds; inconstancy; ‘is’-of-constitution; grounding problem; monism; pluralism; fundamentality

Chapter.  5697 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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