Chapter

Facts

Keith Hossack

in The Metaphysics of Knowledge

Published in print September 2007 | ISBN: 9780199206728
Published online January 2008 | e-ISBN: 9780191709777 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.003.0002
 Facts

More Like This

Show all results sharing this subject:

  • Metaphysics

GO

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter outlines a theory of facts, according to which facts are combinations of particulars and universals. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the relation between the theory of facts and Realism, the traditional metaphysical doctrine of universals. Section 2 places at the centre of the theory of facts and universals the relation of combination, a multigrade relation taking a variable number of terms. Section 3 discusses the ‘vector logic’ of multigrade relations. Section 4 introduces ‘the problem of the unity of the proposition’, i.e., the problem of why it is impossible to judge ‘nonsense’. This turns out to be the same as the problem of the distinction between particulars and universals. Section 5 rejects solutions that invoke extra entities such as propositions or states of affairs. Section 6 offers a solution via the theory of negative facts. Section 7 extends the theory of negative facts to other complex facts, namely conjunctive and general facts. Section 8 further extends the theory of complex facts to allow it to cope with multiple generality, without the need to resort either to ‘logical forms’ or to ‘variables’. Section 9 suggests that an adequate semantic theory for the Predicate Calculus can be developed within the theory of facts.

Keywords: theory of facts; Realism; combination; vector logic; sense; nonsense; negation; complex facts; adequacy condition

Chapter.  27481 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content. subscribe or login to access all content.