Chapter

A Substitutional Theory of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence*

Christopher S. Hill

in Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge

Published in print March 2014 | ISBN: 9780199665822
Published online April 2014 | e-ISBN: 9780191766336 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665822.003.0004
A Substitutional Theory of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence*

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This chapter presents and defends a deflationary theory of truth and other truth‐related semantic properties. More specifically, it is a theory of the semantic properties of propositions and concepts, though it also has applications to the semantic properties of sentences and words. According to the theory, the properties in question can be explicitly defined in terms of substitutional quantification. Contact is made with the correspondence theory of truth by showing that substitutional quantification provides the basis for a definition of an appropriate correspondence relation. Attention is given to the charge that the theory is not sufficiently ‘reductive,’ and to the objection that the defined concepts are two ‘thin’ to explain the role that semantic properties play in laws of nature. Both objections are rejected.

Keywords: deflationism; truth; reference; correspondence theory of truth; substitutional quantification; reduction; folk psychology

Chapter.  7651 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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