in The Microsoft Case: Antitrust, High Technology, and Consumer Welfare

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print July 2007 | ISBN: 9780226644639
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226644653 | DOI:

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This chapter, which explores the remedies in the government case and in the follow-on litigation, demonstrates why the courts in the government case properly rejected divestiture and other forms of structural relief. It also describes how the courts eventually enjoined most, but not all, of the conduct specifically found to be anticompetitive. Antitrust remedies involve costs that a court should impose only if doing so is justified by expected benefits. The courts ultimately rejected any form of structural relief in Microsoft. Over the course of the Microsoft litigation, the courts and commentators considered two kinds of structural remedies. Conduct remedies impose lower costs and provide greater benefits than structural remedies in cases, like Microsoft. Predatory pricing exhibits the significance of defining the relevant harm to competition in the analysis of antitrust injury. Experience in the Microsoft indirect purchaser class actions tends to support the skeptical rule of certification.

Keywords: antitrust remedies; structural remedies; government; litigation; courts; Microsoft; structural relief

Chapter.  16686 words. 

Subjects: Company and Commercial Law

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